Dokuz Eyl\u00fcl University Department of Philosophy and Turkey Kant Society are jointly organising an online event. The event link information is as follows: <\/p>\n\n\n\n
ID:891 1004 0225<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Password: 764190<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Everyone is welcome! The language of the event is English and the talks will not be translated. Please write your name and surname on your Zoom account before participating the event.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Here is some information about speakers and abstracts:<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Sorin Baiasu (Bio): <\/strong>Sorin Baiasu is Professor of Philosophy at Keele University and Director of the Keele-Oxford-St Andrews Kantian (KOSAK) Research Centre. He published one monograph, five edited collections and over thirty studies mainly in ethics, metaphysics and political philosophy. His research was funded, among others, by the British Academy, the European Commission and the European Research Council. Currently he is writing a monograph entitled: Kantian Justice: A Responsibility-enhancing Desert-sensitive Theory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the Critique of Pure Reason<\/em>, in the second division of Transcendental Logic (namely, Transcendental Dialectic), Kant aims to uncover the illusion of transcendental judgements and to keep it from deceiving us; he notes, however, that Transcendental Dialectic cannot make that illusion disappear and warns us that it will hoodwink and thrust reason incessantly into momentary aberrations, which we will then need to remove. (A297-8\/B354-5)[1]<\/a> In his masterful essay, \u201cArmchair Knowledge: Some Kantian Reflections\u201d, A.W. Moore claims thatKant lapses into contradiction as a result of invoking transcendental idealism as a solution to the puzzle of what Moore calls\u201carmchair knowledge\u201d.[2]<\/a> Moore talks about \u201cthe incoherence of transcendental idealism\u201d and, through a discussion which includes the question of whether different subjects possess different categories, offers an account of armchair knowledge without transcendental idealism. He suggests we should abandon the Kantian a priori intuitions and, with them, also Kant\u2019s synthetic a priori judgements. In this talk, I will examine some of the problems identified by Moore in Kant\u2019s account, with particular focus on the contradiction he thinks Kant commits as a result of being forced to accede to synthetic armchair knowledge of how things are in themselves. I discuss Moore\u2019s notion of armchair knowledge, the distinction between analytic and synthetic armchair knowledge, and the difficulty \u2013 exegetical or philosophical \u2013 of attributing to Kant the view either that there is only one set of categories or that different subjects have different sets of categories.I do not aim to show that there is no internal consistency in Kant\u2019s thought or that Moore (perhaps continuing in this way Kant\u2019s project of uncovering the deceptions of transcendental judgements) might not be right to point to potential problems in Kant\u2019s texts; my claim is rather that there are resources in the Kantian corpus to show that Kantian armchair knowledge is possible and transcendental idealism, coherent.[3]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n References<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Baiasu, S. (2016) \u201cIs Kant\u2019s Metaphysics Profoundly Unsatisfactory? Critical Discussion of A. W. Moore\u2019s Critique of Kant\u201d, in Kantian Review<\/em>. 21(3): 465-81.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kant, I. (1996[1781\/1787]) Critique of Pure Reason<\/em>. Tr. W. S. Pluhar. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Moore, A. W. (2016) \u201cReply to Sorin Baiasu and Edward Kanterian\u201d, in Kantian Review<\/em> 21(3): 495-506.<\/p>\n\n\n\n ___________ (Forthcoming) \u201cArmchair Knowledge: Some Kantian Reflections\u201d, in Public Reason<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1]<\/a> I am mainly relying on Werner S. Pluhar\u2019s translation, inthe 1996 unified edition of the first Critique<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
THE POSSIBILITY OF KANTIAN ARMCHAIR KNOWLEDGE<\/strong> (Abstract): <\/p>\n\n\n\n
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